Phase A-E: stability, security, observability, and test coverage
Phase A - Stability: - Engine.Start(): recovers orphaned jobs (running/queued/waking_up) after crash - Engine.Stop(): graceful shutdown - cancels all in-flight jobs and waits - Queue keyed by jobID (not syncPairID): cancel now targets exact job - Local rsync uses jobCtx (context.Background() replaced) - Migrations wrapped in transactions; checksums stored Phase B - Security: - admin/admin default removed: SYNCSERVER_ADMIN_PASSWORD required on first run - Path validation: rejects .., leading -, null bytes in sync pair paths - Rsync flags allowlist: dangerous flags blocked (--rsync-path, -e, --files-from) - Shell concat in RunRemote replaced with proper sh -c escaping - knownhosts: replaced custom parser with golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts - RequireAdmin wired: machine CRUD, SSH key ops, settings require admin role - deploy-keys: uses authorized_keys only (no private key upload) - Hardcoded /var/lib/syncserver/ssh paths replaced with cfg.SSHDir() Phase C - Operational: - /readyz health check: DB query + SSH dir accessibility - /metrics endpoint: Prometheus text format (jobs, queue, machines) - Event struct JSON tags: job_id, machine_id, type (snake_case) - EventBus broadcast: fanned out to all subscribers - SQLite VACUUM INTO backup: scheduled before cleanup if BackupDir set - Filesystem job log cleanup: removes .log files for purged jobs - Backup retention: old backups auto-purged Phase D - Frontend: - Schedules page: REST API + full CRUD UI for cron schedules - Dashboard: cancel button for running/queued jobs - JobDetail: server-side log download via API - Settings: displays data_dir from server - 404 page: proper NotFound component Phase E - Tests: - auth_test.go: JWT, bcrypt, middleware, seed (18 tests) - models_test.go: Job, Machine, SyncPair, Schedule repos (18 tests) - go test -race: no data races found
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@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"time"
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@@ -40,24 +39,17 @@ func dialSSH(ctx context.Context, host string, port int, user, privKeyPath, know
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var capturedFingerprint string
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var capturedPubKey ssh.PublicKey
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callback, err := NewKnownHostsCallback(knownHostsPath, strictHostKeyChecking)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, "", nil, fmt.Errorf("creating host key callback: %w", err)
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}
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hostKeyCallback := func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key ssh.PublicKey) error {
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h := sha256.Sum256(key.Marshal())
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capturedFingerprint = "SHA256:" + base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(h[:])
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capturedPubKey = key
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if strictHostKeyChecking && knownHostsPath != "" {
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kh, err := GetKnownHost(filepath.Dir(knownHostsPath), host, port)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("checking known_hosts: %w", err)
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}
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if kh == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("host key not found in known_hosts: %s", hostname)
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}
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wantFP := kh.Fingerprint
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if capturedFingerprint != wantFP {
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return fmt.Errorf("host key mismatch: got %s, want %s", capturedFingerprint, wantFP)
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}
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}
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return nil
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return callback(hostname, remote, key)
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}
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cfg := &ssh.ClientConfig{
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